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Abstract
We consider an intertemporal framework where different coalitions interact repeat-
edly over time. Both the terms of trade and the endogenous cooperation structure are
characterized, in a protocol-free manner, when:
(C1) A coalition is formed with positive probability if, and only if, the shares ob-
tained by its members weakly exceed their respective share expectations.
(C2) Each matched coalition distributes the entire surplus among its members.
(C3) Members of any coalition are treated symmetrically with respect to their share
expectations.
We show, in particular, that the cooperation structure and the shares are unique
when the game ends each date with vanishing probability.
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1 Introduction
The lion’s share of economic activity takes place in groups and organizations that cooperate
repeatedly. For example, in production economies employees meet regularly in their respec-
tive firms and each meeting results in the production of some output. Similarly, goods and
services are repeatedly exchanged among a given set of traders. Our objective in this paper
is to provide a general approach to these intertemporal situations that, abstracting from the
varying features and contrasting implications of specific matching and bargaining protocols,
provides a unified and robust understanding of the main issues involved.
Formally, our model considers an environment where multiple productive coalitions of
agents can meet over time, each of them limited to participating in one coalition at a time.1
Then, each agent demands a share of the created (and transferable) surplus taking into
account her opportunities in other coalitions. Such demanded shares in turn determine the
probability with which coalitions may form over time. As stressed, our approach to the
problem abstracts from the particular mechanism that may be at work in the process of
formation of the different coalitions and their internal bargaining. Instead, our aim is to
characterize the outcome (i.e. payoff shares and coalitions formed) under the assumption
that, independently of the aforementioned procedural details, the following conditions hold
at any point in the process:
1. Coalitions formed with positive probability are those, and only those, in which each
member obtains at least her expected share.
2. Each matched coalition distributes the entire surplus (as shares) among its members.
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3. Members of any coalition are treated symmetrically with respect to their expected
shares when the surplus of this coalition is distributed.
The first condition determines the cooperation structure given some expected payoff pro-
file over the whole game. It asserts that a coalition will meet whenever it generates enough
surplus to satisfy the expectations of all its members. The second condition requires that all
surplus is distributed among any set of agents who decide to form a coalition. Importantly,
this condition rules out transfers to non-members. The third condition embodies fairness
in the sense of egalitarian treatment of (rational) expectations
As implicitly suggested in our motivation of the model, we can think of the payoff shares
that satisfy the former three conditions as the outcome of dynamic negotiations undertaken
by several parties prior to the actual repeated cooperation. Relatedly, they can be thought
of as embodying some appealing normative criteria that agents will abide by, and insist
upon, when choosing the way in which to allocate their resources. Both views are largely
reflected in the following quote from Shapley and Shubik (1972, p. 116):
"A prudent ’economic’ man [...] would be loath to enter a partnership for a stated share
of the proceeds until he had satisfied himself that more favorable terms could not be obtained
elsewhere. We can imagine that each player would set a price on his participation, and that
no contracts would be signed until the prices [...] are in harmony."
There is a vast literature on surplus sharing and coalition formation. One branch of this
literature is based on non-cooperative models, as surveyed by Ray (2007). Our approach
can be seen as complementary to that pursued by this branch as it abstracts from the
details of the matching and bargaining procedures and turns instead its attention to the
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relevant because it is well-known that, in general, small changes to the postulated rules can
have a major impact on equilibrium outcomes. There is, therefore, the concern that such a
theoretical approach may not be robust to minor modelling details. By way of illustration,
the models considered in Baron and Ferejohn (1989), Chatterjee et al. (1993), Hart andMas-
Colell (1996), Krishna and Serrano (1996), or Okada (2011) lead to quite different outcomes
(e.g. the Shapley value, the nucleolus, or a point belonging to the core) depending on the
specific features of the matching and bargaining environment contemplated in each case.
Protocol-dependence is not an issue for the strand of the literature that relies on coop-
erative game theory and, as in our present approach, is axiomatic and outcome-based. The
stable set (von Neumann—Morgenstern, 1944), core (Gillies, 1953; Shapley, 1953), Shapley
value (Shapley, 1953) and the bargaining set (Aumann and Maschler, 1964) are prominent
examples in the long tradition concerned with such an axiomatic characterization of solu-
tions to cooperative games.2 These concepts, however, are not designed to predict coalition
formation. They answer the fundamentally different question of how the coalitional gains
should be distributed provided that the grand coalition (or some other given coalition struc-
ture) has formed. Moreover, these concepts offer solutions for one-shot games rather than
games that are played repeatedly. There is, however, some literature that adds an intertem-
poral dimension to cooperative games (e.g., Lehrer, 2003; Predtetchinski et al., 2006; Lehrer
and Scarsini, 2013). This literature is concerned with a context very different from ours in
that the payoffs accrue to coalitions over time and any coalition that forms is required to be
2Some cooperative solutions allow players/coalitions to contemplate alternative paths of the game as in
Chwe (1994) or in Ray and Vohra (2015), who modified the concept of the stable set to incorporate farsighted
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robust to “internal" deviations at intermediate stages of the payoff-accumulation process.
Its main focus is also on extensions of the static solution concepts of the classical cooperative
literature to such a context.
Although our framework shares with the classical cooperative game theory its axiomatic
approach, it differs from its standard solutions in two important respects. Firstly, it is
explicitly designed to predict both coalition formation and surplus sharing. Secondly and
more importantly, it is driven by the dynamic structure of our game and is not restricted by
an (arbitrary) time limit. It is precisely this structure that allows for the joint computation
of the matching probabilities and shares, relying alone on the Conditions 1-3 that embody
their mutual consistency.
In particular, our Conditions 1 and 3 formalize the idea that expectations should play a
prominent role in the computation of players’ shares. “Rational" (in the sense of consistent)
expectations have, of course, long been an integral part of equilibrium analysis in non-
cooperative game theory. Recently, they have also found their way into cooperative game
theory (see e.g., Jordan, 2006; Dutta and Vohra, 2017). There is also substantial empirical
evidence that expectations, as much as fairness, are important drivers of human behavior
(see, e.g., Sunder, 1995; Harrison and McCabe, 1996; Bohnet and Zeckhauser 2004). In
particular, expectations can induce (or be the result of) prevailing social conventions — see
Acemoglu and Jackson (2015) for a model of this reciprocal dependence. It is natural,
therefore, to think of expectations as setting a benchmark. The idea that agents compare a
bargaining outcome to their respective benchmarks relates our work to the solution concepts
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In summary, this paper is a novel approach to repeated coalitional interactions. It pro-
poses a solution to the ubiquitous problem of repeated matching and bargaining without
imposing an arbitrary time limit or protocols on these processes. As a positive concept,
this solution aims at providing predictions that are not sensitive to modelling details. Al-
ternatively, it can be also interpreted as a normative concept used, e.g., by a mediator to
induce outcomes with some desirable properties.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the repeated
coalitional game with random termination times, show that there always exist shares and
probabilities that satisfy Conditions 1-3 (Proposition 2) and characterize them in terms of
the expected shares (Proposition 1). In the limit case of vanishing termination probabil-
ity, we obtain the unique set of cooperating coalitions and unique shares that satisfy the
aforementioned conditions and provide implicit formulae for their computation (Theorem
1). Proposition 3 (and Proposition 5 in the Appendix) provide then a number of interesting
properties that our solution concept satisfies in the limit case. Next, in Section 3 we apply
our abstract theoretical framework to a trading context where agents display heterogeneous
valuations and can buy or sell an homogeneous good repeatedly as allowed by some under-
lying network. When trading possibilities are unrestricted (i.e. the underlying network is
complete), we show that all transactions are carried out at a uniform price (Proposition 4).
However, we also show that when the underlying network is incomplete, trading at different
prices can arise with some agents playing the role of (endogenous) arbitrageurs who buy
and sell the good. Section 4 concludes with a summary. All proofs of our results, and some
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2 Consistent Probabilities and Shares
We denote by N = {1, ..., n} a finite set of players, by 2N the set of all subsets of N
and we set Θ ≡ 2N\∅. The value function v : 2N → R is zero-normalized, v(∅) = 0,
and for each coalition C ∈ Θ, it assigns the (possibly negative) total surplus v(C) that C
generates if actually formed. We consider an intertemporal game3 Γ(v, δ) that unfolds over
an infinite number of discrete dates. At the start of each date, the game either terminates
with probability 1 − δ or continues with the complementary probability δ ∈ [0, 1].4 In the
former case, all players leave the game with zero payoffs. Otherwise, at most5 one (possibly
empty) coalition C ∈ 2N may form with probability πC and create the surplus v(C) to be
divided among the members i ∈ C according to the shares {ϕCi }i∈C . Each share ϕ
C
i can be
interpreted as the price that i receives for her input or cooperation in coalition C.
Probabilities {πC}C∈Θ, where π
∅ = 1 −

C∈Θ π






assumed publicly known and stationary, i.e. constant over time. Jointly, these shares and
probabilities allow us to compute, for each agent i ∈ N , a reference payoff that will play a
central role in our analysis. This is the share that i expects to receive in her first subsequent
cooperation in some active coalition taking into account that the game may terminate before
this happens. Ex ante, a first such active role may materialize at different points in the
future, provided the process continues to operate. Or, it may not materialize if the game
3We refer to the described intertemporal interaction as a game although, strictly speaking, it does not
fit the conventional definitions in non-cooperative game theory.
4Alternatively, δ can also be regarded as a time discount factor, applied to future utilities or, more
generally, as the product of the continuation probability and the discount factor. Nothing substantial
changes in our analysis by this reinterpretation.
5This assumption simplifies the notation. Our results hold when any number of non-intersecting coalitions











This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
ends before i becomes active. In this latter case, agent i assumes a payoff equal to zero
when computing the expectation. Accordingly, the expected share, which we simply denote

















C + 1− δ
ϕCi .
The first line in (1) defines the expected share ϕi per future cooperation for player i and
contemplates two possibilities. One of them, occurring with probability 1 − δ, is that the
game ends before the next period arrives. This would result in all players earning zero
payoffs and is omitted in that expression for the sake of simplicity. Alternatively, with the
complementary probability δ, the game continues. In this case, player i envisages one of
two possibilities:
• she cooperates in one of the active coalitions C where she is a member and obtains
the share ϕCi with corresponding probability π
C ;
• she remains inactive and anticipates holding an unchanged share expectation ϕi there-
upon.
Note that the former derivations rely on our stationarity assumption on matching prob-
abilities and shares. The second line in (1) follows by simple algebraic manipulation and
expresses ϕi as a weighted average of shares that i receives in coalitions where she is a
member. The corresponding weights are proportional to the matching probabilities and
they sum up to less than (equal to) unity when δ < 1 (δ = 1).6 One can think of ϕi as a
benchmark by which i decides whether to participate or not in a coalition and the minimal
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demand she makes in case of participation.






that define our proposed solution to the intertemporal game. These
conditions appear below:
(C1) Coalition formation compatible with payoff expectations:
(2) ∀C ∈ Θ, πC > 0⇔ [∀i ∈ C, ϕCi ≥ ϕi].
(C2) Local efficiency:





(C3) Egalitarian treatment relative to payoff expectations:
(4) ∀C ∈ Θ, ∀i, k ∈ C, ϕCi − ϕi = ϕ
C
k − ϕk.
Axiom (C1) guarantees that a non-empty coalition is formed with positive probability
if, and only if, the shares ϕCi proposed for each of its members i ∈ C do not fall below their
expectations ϕi. Heuristically, we may envisage this situation as follows: In the interim
stage, when coalition C considers forming, if any of the players i ∈ C finds her share ϕCi
unacceptable (i.e. below her expectations) she walks away and the coalition is, in fact, not
formed. In this sense, we can say that (C1) guarantees individual rationality. Condition
(C2) requires that, if a coalition is formed, the entire surplus (loss) is distributed among its
members. This condition is violated, for example, when taxes are imposed on coalitional
production. Axiom (C3) posits egalitarian treatment of players’ expectations in the sense
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of the excess surplus. This condition can be generalized by assigning player-specific weights
αi to each agent i ∈ N and, then, requiring that
(5) αi(ϕ
C
i − ϕi) = αk(ϕ
C
k − ϕk), ∀i, k ∈ C, ∀C ∈ Θ.
Most of our qualitative results would still hold in that case but then the shares would, of
course, depend on players’ weights.
As anticipated in the introduction, (C1)-(C3) allow for different interpretations. On the
one hand, they can be regarded as a set of rules that a mediator would adopt if motivated by
considerations of intertemporal fairness with respect to expectations. In this interpretation,
the termination probability (or the discount factor) matters as it is instrumental in defining
expectations (1). Although we will focus below on the limit scenario as δ approaches one,
it is instructive to reflect upon the polar case of δ = 0. Then, the expected shares are
zero for every player and, therefore, our condition (C3) implies that the division of surplus
for every coalition follows the classical Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) under a uniform
disagreement point of zero. The NBS is, therefore, embedded in our intertemporal model
as a particular case when, in effect, time plays no relevant role.
Alternatively, conditions (C1)-(C3) provide a protocol-free prediction for a general
process of coalition formation and bargaining. In this interpretation, axiom (C3) implies
that symmetric (focal) outcomes will be selected. If there are asymmetries (e.g., with re-
spect to different bargaining powers), we can replace (C3) by a generalized formulation (5)






and the corresponding expected shares
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(C3). Given some consistent shares and probabilities, we will refer to the set,
(6) Aϕ ≡ {C ∈ Θ : πC > 0},
as cooperation structure. We shall also use the terms active and inactive to distinguish
between the coalitions that belong to the set Aϕ from those that do not. As the notation
Aϕ suggests, in order to determine whether a particular coalition C is active or not it is
enough to know the expected consistent shares {ϕi}i∈C . It turns out that these shares
also suffice to compute the actual shares of v(C) that the members of C obtain when this
coalition is matched. Therefore, the expected consistent shares (ECS) contain the essential
information on the equilibrium outcome as summarized in the following result. (Recall that
all proofs are included in the Appendix.)
P 1 The expected consistent shares ϕ = {ϕi}i∈N determine the cooperation struc-
ture and consistent shares in all coalitions:
∀C ∈ Θ, πC > 0⇔ v(C) ≥

k∈C ϕk,(7)






where #C is the cardinality of the set C.
From (7) follows that ϕ specifies uniquely the cooperation structure Aϕ but not the
precise (positive) matching probabilities. On the other hand, the shares computed in (8)
reflect fairness or equal bargaining power in the following sense: whenever the surplus of
the coalition exceeds the sum of expected payoffs (i.e. what agents will minimally insist
upon to form the coalition), the difference is split up evenly among its members. While
members of an active coalition receive the shares (8) when this coalition is matched, for
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Proposition 1 suggests that consistent magnitudes can be conceived of as either “prim-
itive" or “derived" in two somewhat reciprocal ways: On the one hand, given the coalition
formation probabilities {πC}C∈Θ and the consistent shares {ϕ
C
i }C∈Θ,i∈C , unique cooper-
ation structure Aϕ and unique ECS {ϕi}i∈N follow directly. On the other, we can use
Proposition 1 to obtain from the ECS {ϕi}i∈N (now conceived as primitives) the consistent
shares {ϕCi }C∈Θ,i∈C and the cooperation structure A
ϕ. We cannot, however, obtain from
the ECS the precise values of the matching probabilities {πC}C∈Θ. For a stark illustration
of this indeterminacy, consider the extreme case where δ = 0. Then, the ECS ϕi = 0 for all
i ∈ N . This implies that, for every coalition C and player i ∈ C, the consistent share ϕCi =
v(C)/#C, i.e., ϕCi coincides with the share induced by the classical NBS for a uniform
disagreement point equal to zero. Furthermore, the unique coalition structure Aϕ contains
all non-empty coalitions C for which v(C) ≥ 0. However, these ECS allow for an arbitrary
distribution of consistent probabilities {πC}C∈Θ that are positive if and only if C ∈ A
ϕ.
In the remainder of this section, we examine the existence, uniqueness, and other prop-
erties of consistent probabilities and shares. First, we settle the existence issue.
P 2 Consistent probabilities and shares exist in any game Γ(v, δ).
Unsurprisingly, under our mild conditions, there is generally a multiplicity of probabil-
ities and shares that qualify as consistent. The next example illustrates this multiplicity.
E 1 Consider a single buyer (player 1) and two identical sellers (players 2 and 3), where
each buyer-seller pair can generate one unit of surplus. Formally, N = {1, 2, 3}, v({1, 2}) =
v({1, 3}) = 1 and v(C) = 0 for any other subset C ⊆ N . It can be easily verified that the
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where πC = 0 for all other subsets C ⊆ N . Thus, while the first alternative is symmetric
across the two sellers, the second one provides seller 2 with a higher (expected) consistent share
than seller 3. The cooperation structure is the same in both cases, Aϕ = {{1, 2}, {1, 3}}, with
equal matching probabilities for {1, 2} and {1, 3} in the first case and asymmetric probabilities
in the second.
In view of the above, our main focus turns to situations where the termination proba-
bility is arbitrarily small. Formally, we consider a sequence of games {Γ(v, δk)}k∈N, where
the continuation probabilities {δk}k∈N converge to one, i.e.
lim
k→∞
δk = 1, or simply {δk}k∈N → 1.
Then, for each game Γ(v, δk) in this sequence, we consider some consistent shares and
probabilities, which we denote by {ϕC,δki }C∈Θ,i∈C and {π
C,δk}C∈Θ, respectively. Such shares
and probabilities always exist by Proposition 2. To avoid inessential technicalities, we
shall require that, for every C ∈ Θ, any strictly positive subsequence {πC,δkτ }τ∈N remains
bounded away from zero. Formally,
(9) ∀{δkτ }τ∈N → 1,






Essentially, this condition embodies the idea that every coalition that forms with positive
probability when δk is arbitrarily close to one should also do so in the limit.
Given any sequences of coalitional shares and probabilities as specified above, we may
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The limit values of these shares as δk → 1 will be called Limit Expected Consistent Shares
(LECS). Our main result below establishes that the LECS exist, are unique, and admit a
simple characterization.
T 1 A sequence of expected consistent shares and corresponding coalition-formation
probabilities {{ϕδki }i∈N , {π
C,δk}C∈Θ}k∈N that satisfies (9) always exists. Under this condition,
as δk → 1 the sequence of shares {{ϕ
δk
i }i∈N}k∈N converges to the LECS {ϕi}i∈N , which are








k∈C xk ≥ v(C), ∀C ⊆ N.
The previous result establishes that, as the termination probability (1 − δ) becomes
arbitrarily small, the expected consistent shares approach some limit values that can be
computed as the unique solution of a simple optimization problem.7 In fact, as we shall see
in Proposition 3 below, such limit values do not just capture agents’ (accurate or rational)
expectations of their respective shares in their next cooperation. They also approximate
the shares the agents actually receive as part of any active coalition they belong to, when
the termination probability is low.
Interestingly, the quadratic program (10) also determines unique limit payoffs (for sym-
metric players) in the bargaining model proposed by Nguyen (2015). However, his non-
cooperative framework is quite different from ours as it follows a specific protocol with fixed
matching probabilities. Moreover, players leave the game and are replaced by “clones"
upon agreement in his game. The formal similarity between the two solutions stems from
7We note that the computation of the LECS from (10) is reminiscent of the coalitional Nash bargaining
solution in Compte and Jehiel (2010). Their solution (defined for games with non-empty cores) is identified
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the fact that the limit payoffs in Nguyen (2015) are computed from a system of equations
that resembles conditions for the computation of the LECS in our model (see the proofs of
Proposition 2 and Theorem 1 in the Appendix).
On a more technical vein, it is worth mentioning that the LECS obtained as the termi-
nation probability vanishes can also be seen as a robust selection (or refinement) among the
multiplicity of possible consistent solutions that generally arise when δ = 1. To illustrate
starkly that, in general, such a selection procedure is not trivial (i.e. a wide multiplicity can
indeed arise), consider the simple example of two agents (N = {1, 2}) and a value function
with v(N) = 1 and v(C) = 0 for C = {1, 2}. Then, for the game Γ(v, 1), any configuration
with πN > 0 and shares ϕN1 = 1− ϕ
N
2 = γ is consistent for any γ ∈ [0, 1]. In contrast, the
unique LECS are equal to ϕi = ϕNi = 1/2 for i = 1, 2.
As we have repeatedly emphasized, the theoretical framework that underlies LECS is
inherently dynamic and this sets it apart from the axiomatic approach typically pursued by
cooperative game theory. One may wonder, however, whether there is any parallelism or
similarity between LECS and some of the standard solution concepts for the corresponding
(static) cooperative games. The following example illustrates that this is not the case, and
indeed the reasons for this are grounded in the dynamic underpinning of our concept.
E 2 (Example 1 cont.) In the game defined in example 1, let us replace v(N) = 0 by








exceeds the value of the grand coalition, which contrasts with most of the solutions proposed
in the cooperative game literature. For example, the Shapley value of the corresponding static
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Moreover, as the game considered is an assignment game (see Shapley and Shubik, 1971), its
kernel and nucleolus lie in the core (Schmeidler, 1969, and Driessen, 1998, respectively), while
its bargaining set coincides with the core (Solymosi and Raghavan, 2001). Hence, LECS are
different from all of these concepts. Also the d-core (Albers, 1979) or the aspiration core
(Bennett, 1983) coincide with the core in this game. In Section 3, we generalize this example
to a trading game with many players and heterogeneous valuations.
The next Proposition 3 gives some useful properties of the LECS ϕ, the limit cooper-
ation structure Aϕ and the limit shares {ϕCi }C∈Θ,i∈C obtained from ϕ by Proposition 1.
(Additional interesting properties are included in Proposition 5 in the Appendix.)
P 3 LECS ϕ display the following features.
(i) (Rational expectations) ϕCi = ϕi for all C ∈ Aϕ and i ∈ C.
(ii) (Blocking-proof)

k∈C ϕk ≥ v(C), ∀C ⊆ N , and

k∈C ϕk = v(C), ∀C ⊆ Aϕ.












The above proposition highlights three interesting properties of the LECS concept. Item
(i) was already anticipated: every coalition in the limit cooperation structure allows each
of its constituent players to fulfil exactly their expected payoff. Next, Item (ii) specifies
that every coalition C has to contemplate (if C is not in the limit cooperation structure,
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all its members. This, as suggested by our labelling, can be interpreted as assuming that
any subset of agents in C whose expectations are not met can block the formation (and
hence even the meaningful consideration) of that coalition. Note that the second part of
this condition implies that all coalitions in the limit cooperation structure satisfy exactly
the expectations of their members.
Finally, Item (iii) has the following interpretation. Suppose that, given LECS {ϕi}i∈N , a
planner considers the possibility of implementing an alternative (limit) pattern of coalition-
formation probabilities {	πC}C∈Θ and coalition-based shares {	ϕCi }C∈Θ,i∈C , which are not
necessarily derived from consistent sequences. This in turn yields some corresponding limit
expected shares (again, not necessarily consistent), denoted by {	ϕi}i∈N . It is immediate
to see that the induced limit expected shares {	ϕi}i∈C in (11) obtain from (1) as δ → 1.
Then, the property (iii) simply asserts that, even if the planner can implement a pattern of
matching probabilities and shares free from the requirement of consistency, the expectation
profile embodied by LECS cannot be dominated in the Pareto sense.
3 Repeated Trade (in Networks)
In this section, we apply our framework to a model of recurring trade in some homogeneous
good, where agents can assume endogenous roles of buyers or sellers depending on their
current partner. We consider, specifically, the following trading scenario. Each player
i ∈ N has the valuation ωi ≥ 0 for one unit of the good. We can think of this good as
a (financial) asset and of ωi as i’s price expectation for this asset over a certain period.
Alternatively, i can be the representative merchant of a good in country i and ωi the price
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when matched with another agent, player i will be willing to buy (sell) the good only if she
can do it at a price below (above) ωi. For simplicity, we assume that at most one unit8
of the good is traded in each transaction and neither short-selling nor liquidity constraints
are binding i.e., a matched pair will always exchange the good if this is profitable for both
parties. We call an agent buyer (seller) if she buys (sells) the good in all her transactions. If
a player assumes different roles in her transactions, we will call her an arbitrageur. In order
to avoid uninteresting technicalities, we assume different valuations that we sort (without
the loss of generality) in an increasing order, ω1 < ω2 < ... < ωn.
We model the underlying trade connections through a network G = {N,L}, in which
pairs of agents from the setN are connected by links in the set L ⊆ {{i, k} : i, k ∈ N, i = k}.
For each connected pair, we define their trade surplus as the total gain available from
transferring a unit of good from the low- to the high-valuation agent, i.e.
(12) v({i, k}) = |ωi − ωk|, ∀{i, k} ∈ L,
while any other coalition of agents does not generate any surplus:
(13) v(C) = 0, ∀C /∈ L.
First, we focus on the case of unrestricted bilateral trade, i.e., we assume that the
network is complete. That is, L = {{i, k} : i, k ∈ N, i = k}, which implies that every pair
of agents can trade. The next proposition shows that, under these circumstances, the LECS
entail a unique (and thus uniform) price for the good in all transactions.
P 4 Let ω = (ω1, ..., ωn) be the distinct valuations of players in the set N and
let the function v be defined by (12)-(13) for the complete connection structure L = {{i, k} :
i, k ∈ N, i = k}. Then, the LECS satisfy ϕi = |ωi − p| for all i ∈ N , where p = 1n
n
k=1 ωk.
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This proposition establishes that each active pair trades the good at the common price
p that is equal to the average valuation. This price partitions the set N into two sets,
depending on whether their valuation lies above or below the average valuation. Each
agent in the first set acts as a buyer and everyone in the second as a seller. Thus, in the
complete network, there are no arbitrageurs. Typically, unless p happens to be a Walrasian
price (and n is even), the number of buyers will be different from that of sellers. Hence, in
general, the “market" will not clear, with demand not being equal to supply. Furthermore,
only links connecting buyers to sellers will be active (and, therefore, matched with a positive
probability). In the language of graph theory, the set of active links induces a complete
bipartite subnetwork of G, the set of buyers and sellers defining the two parts.
Next, we relax the assumption that the network is complete and turn our attention
to the impact of an incomplete connection structure L. Basically, we want to assess the
ability of L to replicate the outcome obtained under the complete network, for which all
players trade at the same price. We refer to this benchmark as the Uniform-Price (UP)
outcome. The following example discusses several contrasting cases for a simple four-player
context where the trading network is a line. Subsequently, we discuss the problem more
widely through a numerical investigation for the six connected network architectures that
may arise with four nodes.
E 3 Consider the network {N,L}, where N = {1, ..., 4} and L = {{1, 2}, {2, 3},
{3, 4}}.The network is therefore a line with three links. We compute the LECS in this network
for the value function (12)-(13) and for different valuation profiles. The results are collected
in Table 1. For the profile ω = (3, 1, 1
2




) imply that only
two pairs, {1, 2} and {3, 4}, trade at the respective prices 2 and 1
4











This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
the link {2, 3} although ω2 = ω3. For ω = (
1
2
, 3, 0, 5
2
), all players trade at the common price
3
2
that is equal to the average valuation. Hence, the restrictions on the connection structure
are irrelevant and the UP outcome is attained. A situation with arbitrageurs occurs for ω =
(3, 2, 1, 0). In this case, player 1 is a seller and 4 a buyer, while players 2 and 3 are arbitrageurs
and both sell and buy the good. Finally, the profile ω = (1, 3, 1
2
, 0) illustrates the possibility
that a player is excluded from trade (player 4 in this case), even though all actual trade that
does occur takes place at a uniform price.
(ω1,ω2,ω3,ω4) (ϕ1,ϕ2,ϕ3,ϕ4) Roles Prices
(3, 1, 1
2
























































) computed for different valuation profiles (ω1, ω2, ω3, ω4) from (12)-
(13) with L = {{1, 2}, {2, 3}, {3, 4}}. The LECS imply different roles and prices for the four
nodes-agents. The possible roles are: buyer (B), seller (S), arbitrageur (A), and inactive (I). The prices
reflect the implicit terms of trade in each of the three links, where "−" means no trade.
As the last example illustrates, an incomplete network can be compatible with different
outcomes, including the UP outcome, depending on valuations. Next, we conduct a short
simulation exercise where we illustrate further, in a more extensive manner, the role that
the network structure may have on the achievement or not of the UP outcome. We do so
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nodes,
L1 = {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {1, 4}}, L2 = {{1, 2}, {2, 3}, {3, 4}},
L3 = {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {1, 4}, {2, 3}}, L4 = {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 4}, {3, 4}},
L5 = {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}, {2, 4}, {3, 4}}, L6 = {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {1, 4}, {2, 3}, {2, 4}, {3, 4}}.
The numerical exploration is carried out as follows. First, for each of the network ar-
chitectures considered, Lx (x = 1, ..., 6), we draw a random sample ω of four valuations
independently from the uniform distribution on the interval [0, 1]. Then, we compute the
LECS obtained from these valuations (given the value function (12)-(13)) and each archi-
tecture. Finally, we verify whether the LECS are consistent with the UP outcome, i.e.,
whether,




k=1 ωk|, i = 1, ..., 4.
After repeating this procedure 10,000 times, we compute for each architecture Lx the rel-
ative frequency µ(Lx) of LECS that satisfy the condition (14). This frequency can be
interpreted as an index of market incompleteness of Lx with lower values indicating a more
incomplete market. This index attains the minimum of zero for a disconnected network
and the maximum value of one for the complete network. The index values for each of the
architectures depicted in Figure 1 are as follows:
µ(L1) = 0.11, µ(L2) = 0.16, µ(L3) = 0.35,
µ(L4) = 0.30, µ(L5) = 0.62, µ(L6) = 1.
Note, for example, that networks with the same number of links can differ significantly in
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4 Conclusions
We propose an equilibrium notion for intertemporal coalitional bargaining that is protocol-
free and is solely characterized by three natural conditions on the probabilities with which
different coalitions form and on the shares that players earn in each of them. Probabilities
and shares satisfying these conditions are called consistent and are shown to exist in any
game. For games with vanishing termination probability, the expected consistent shares
are computed as the unique solution to an inequality-constrained quadratic program. We
derive some of their properties and apply the general framework to a trading game, where
productive coalitions are restricted to be pairs connected by an underlying network. When
this network is complete, trade takes place at a uniform price and agents can be categorized
into buyers or sellers. In contrast, if the network is incomplete, trade may occur at different
prices and there may be some agents (arbitrageurs) who buy and sell, depending on their
matched partners, the homogeneous good.
5 Appendix
The function v(·) and the set Θ in the proofs below have been defined in Section 2.
L 1 The following function gC : Rn → R is convex.
gC(x) ≡ (max{∆C(x), 0})2,(15)
where, ∆C(x) ≡ v(C)−

k∈C xk, C ∈ Θ.(16)
Proof : Follows from the fact that the maximum of linear functions is convex and that
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






max{∆C(x), 0}, ∀i ∈ N,
where #C is the cardinality of the set C, ωC,δ ∈ [0, 1] and ∆C(x) is defined in (16).
(1) The system (17) has a unique uniformly bounded solution xδ for any δ ∈ [0, 1).
(2) If ωC,δ ∈ [ǫ, 1], 0 < ǫ < 1 for all C ∈ Θ and δ ∈ [0, 1), then x = limδ→1 xδ is the unique








k∈C xk ≥ v(C), ∀C ∈ Θ.
Proof : (1) In Lemma 1, we show that the function gC(.) defined in (15) is convex.













is a sum of a (strictly) convex functions and is strictly convex itself. This function has then
a unique (strict) minimum at some point xδ ∈ Rn+ with 0 ≤ x
δ
i ≤ maxC⊆N v(C) for all




are well-defined for all x ∈ Rn (in particular, for any x such that ∆C(x) = 0, the right
and the left partial derivatives are both equal zero). Then, it can be readily verified that
the first order conditions ▽gδ(x) = 0 that determine the unique minimizer xδ are identical
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(2) As the solution xδ to (17) is unique, uniformly bounded and continuous in δ ∈ [0, 1),






max{∆C(x), 0}, ∀i ∈ N,
we observe that the l.h.s. of the last system converges to zero as δ → 1 because each xδi
is bounded. The same must then hold for the r.h.s., which for ωC,δ ≥ ǫ > 0 implies in the
limit,
(20) max{∆C(x), 0} = 0⇒ v(C) ≤k∈C xk, ∀C ∈ Θ.
We conclude, therefore, that x ∈ Φ ≡ {z ∈ Rn : v(C) ≤ k∈C zk, ∀C ∈ Θ} and note that





x2k, because v(C) ≤

k∈C
xk ⇒ gC(x) = 0.
Now, we show that gδ(xδ) converges to

k∈N x2k/2 as δ → 1. For the minimizer xδ of gδ(.),
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In order to prove that x minimizes k∈N z2k/2 over Φ, we assume, for the sake of contra-
diction, that
∃z ∈ Φ :k∈N x2k/2 >

k∈N z2k/2.







k∈N z2k/2 = gδ(z),
which contradicts that xδ is the global minimizer of gδ(.). 
Proof of Proposition 1: First, we prove each of the implications in
πC > 0⇔ v(C) ≥

k∈N ϕk :




i = v(C) ≥

i∈C ϕi,







i∈C ϕi ⇒ ϕ
C
i ≥ ϕi, ∀i ∈ C ⇒ π
C > 0,
where we used, consecutively, C2, C3 and C1.
Then, we show the second part of the proposition,






by combining C2 and C3:
ϕCi − ϕi = ϕ
C









i∈C ϕi = v(C)−

i∈C ϕi = ∆
C(ϕ). 
Proof of Proposition 2: First, we prove the claim for a fixed δ < 1. Let π̂C,δ = 1/#Θ
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· I(∆C(ϕδ)), ∀C ∈ Θ,
where I(x) = 1 if x ≥ 0 and I(x) = 0 otherwise. For the solution ϕδ and each C ∈ Θ and
i ∈ C, we compute the corresponding shares by Proposition 1,






It is readily verified that ϕδi , π
C,δ and ϕC,δi computed from (22), (23) and (24), respectively,
















while (23) implements C1 by Proposition 1,






and (24) obtains by combining C2 and C3.
For δ = 1, let ϕ1 = {ϕ1i }i∈N be the unique solution to the optimization problem (18)
established by Lemma 2. Then, it is straightforward to verify that the expected shares




i for each i ∈ C ∈ Θ and the
probabilities πC,1 = 1
#Θ
· I(∆C(ϕ1)) jointly satisfy (1) and (C1)-(C3). 
Proof of Theorem 1: First, we show that sequences of coalitional shares and proba-
bilities satisfying (9) always exist. Recall that, in the proof of Proposition 2, we rely on the
unique solution ϕδ to the system (22) to obtain consistent shares {ϕC,δ}C∈Θ (from (24))
and consistent probabilities {πC,δ}C∈Θ (from (23)) for any δ ∈ [0, 1). This construction
implies that πC,δ = 1/#Θ whenever πC,δ > 0. Hence, for any sequence {δk}k∈N → 1, the
corresponding ECS sequence {ϕδk}k∈N is computed by (1) from shares {{ϕ
C,δk}C∈Θ}k∈N
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Next, we show that LECS exist. This requires proving that the ECS sequence {ϕδk}k∈N

















max{∆C(ϕδk), 0}, ∀i ∈ N.
The solution to this system does not change if expression (25) is changed so that for all
those C ∈ Θ for which πC,δk = 0, we have instead πC,δk = 1/#Θ. This is because, by
Proposition 1,





C(ϕδk), 0} = 0.
After this substitution, by (9), πC,δk ≥ ǫ for some ǫ > 0 and all C ∈ Θ, δk < 1. Then, by
Lemma 2(2), the solution to (25) converges to some LECS ϕ when (δk)k∈N → 1, as desired.
Finally, to establish uniqueness of LECS simply note that the preceding argument does
not depend on the particular sequences of coalitional shares and probabilities considered.
Therefore, any consistent sequences that satisfy (9) must have their induced ECS converge
to the same limit. 
Proof of Proposition 3: Properties of the LECS ϕ:
(i) (rational expectations) ϕCi = ϕi for all C ∈ Aϕ and i ∈ C: This claim follows from
(8) in Proposition 1 and the property (ii) below.
(ii) (Blocking-proof)

k∈C ϕk ≥ v(C), ∀C ⊆ N , and

k∈C ϕk = v(C), ∀C ⊆ Aϕ: The
first part follows from the restrictions in the quadratic program (10). This part, combined
with (7) in Proposition 1 and the definition (6) of cooperation structure, yields the second











This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
(iii) (Pareto efficiency): For the sake of contradiction assume that there are probabilities













We define an #N×#Θ matrix Ψ with the typical element ψi,C ≡ 	πC(	ϕCi −ϕi) in row i ∈ N









i∈C ϕi) ≤ 	πC(v(C)−

i∈C ϕi) ≤ 0,
by the fact that

i∈C 	ϕCi ≤ v(C) and the property (ii) above. On the other hand, the sum









	πC(	ϕCi − ϕi) = (

C∈Θ:i∈C
	πC)(	ϕi − ϕi) ≥ 0,




i∈N ϕi. Hence, we reach a contradiction
as the sum of elements of Ψ is non-positive when summing up the columns but it is strictly
positive when summing up the rows. 
Proof of Proposition 4: Surplus sharing by an active pair in our trading game can
be interpreted as a transaction, in which one unit of the good is exchanged at a price. For
the sake of contradiction, we assume that two pairs of players, ab ∈ L and cd ∈ L, trade
the good in the limit equilibrium at two different prices, pab and pcd, respectively. Without
the loss of generality, we assume,
ωa ≥ pab ≥ ωb, ωc ≥ pcd ≥ ωd, and pab > pcd.
Hence, a, c (b, d) buy (sell) the good at the respective prices pab and pcd earning the shares,
ϕa = ϕ{a,b}a = ωa − pab, ϕc = ϕ{c,d}c = ωc − pcd,(26)
ϕb = ϕ
{a,b}
b = pab − ωb, ϕd = ϕ
{c,d}
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where the expected and actual shares are equal by Proposition 3(i). We note that,
ϕa + ϕb = |ωa − ωb| = v({a, b}),
ϕc + ϕd = |ωc − ωd| = v({c, d}),
as stipulated by Proposition 3(ii) for each active coalition. Then, Proposition 3(ii) implies
a contradiction for the link (coalition) ad ∈ L,
v({a, d}) ≤ ϕa + ϕd = ωa − pab + pcd − ωd = |ωa − ωd| − (pab − pcd)
= v({a, d})− (pab − pcd) < v({a, d}),
where the second equality and the last inequality follow from our assumption ωa ≥ pab >
pcd ≥ ωd. We conclude, therefore, that all transactions in the complete network occur at
the same price p.
Computation of p: The price p partitions the set of players into the set of sellers S =
{i : ωi < p} and the set of buyers B = {i : ωi ≥ p}. We can compute the total payoff to
each set by Proposition 5(f) below,











































We end the Appendix with a result that complements Proposition 3 with some additional
properties of LECS, followed by a discussion on the formal and conceptual relationship
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P 5 In addition to those listed in Proposition 3, LECS ϕ and the corresponding
limit cooperation structure Aϕ display the following properties.
(a) (degree-1 homogeneity) ϕ(α · v) = α · ϕ for all α ∈ R+.
(b) (null player) ϕi = 0 if v(C ∪ {i}) = v(C) for all C ⊆ N\{i}.
(c) (symmetry) ϕi = ϕk if v(C ∪ {i}) = v(C ∪ {k}) for all C ⊆ N\{i, k}.
(d) (marginal contribution) v(T ∪{i})− v(T ) ≤ ϕi ≤ v(C)− v(C\{i}), ∀T,C ∈ Aϕ, i /∈ T,
i ∈ C.
(e) (feasibility) ϕi > 0⇒ ∃C ∈ Aϕ : i ∈ C.











T∈Θ:T =C #(C ∩ T )
zv(T )
#T
, ∀C ∈ Aϕ,(27)
zv(C) = 0, ∀C ∈ Θ\Aϕ.
Proof :
(a) (degree-1 homogeneity) ϕ(α · v) = α · ϕ for all α ∈ R+: The following representation
of ϕ as a sum of unique Lagrange multipliers λT ,
ϕi =

T∈Θ:i∈T λT , λT ≥ 0,(28)
λT (v(T )−

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follows from the KKT conditions for the inequality-constrained quadratic program (18).
Then, the α·ϕ in the game α·v are obtained from the unique Lagrange multipliers λT (α·v) =
α · λT .
(b) (null player) ϕi = 0 if v(C ∪ {i}) = v(C) for all C ⊆ N\{i}: For the sake of
contradiction assume ϕi > 0 for a dummy player i. Hence, by Proposition 5(e), there is a
coalition T ⊆ N such that

t∈T ϕt + ϕi = v(T ∪ {i}) > 0 (note that ϕi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N
by Proposition 5(f)). By Proposition 3(ii) and the definition of the dummy player,

t∈T ϕt ≥ v(T ) = v(T ∪ {i}) =

t∈T ϕt + ϕi,
which implies ϕi = 0.
(c) (symmetry) ϕi = ϕk if v(C ∪ {i}) = v(C ∪ {k}) for all C ⊆ N\{i, k}: For the sake
of contradiction and w.l.o.g. assume ϕi > ϕk ≥ 0. Hence, by Proposition 5(e), there is
a coalition T ⊆ N such that

t∈T ϕt + ϕi = v(T ∪ {i}) > 0. Then, by our assumption
ϕi > ϕk, Proposition 3(ii) and the definition of the symmetric player,
v(T ∪ {i}) =

t∈T ϕt + ϕi >

t∈T ϕt + ϕk ≥ v(T ∪ {k}) = v(T ∪ {i}),
which yields a contradiction.
(d) (marginal contribution) v(T ∪ {i}) − v(T ) ≤ ϕi ≤ v(C) − v(C\{i}), ∀T,C ∈ Aϕ,
i /∈ T, i ∈ C: This follows directly from Proposition 3(ii),

t∈T ϕt + ϕi ≥ v(T ∪ {i})⇒ ϕi ≥ v(T ∪ {i})−

t∈T ϕt = v(T ∪ {i})− v(T ),

t∈C\{i} ϕt + ϕi = v(C)⇒ ϕi = v(C)−

t∈C\{i} ϕt ≤ v(C)− v(C\{i}).
(e) (feasibility) ϕi > 0⇒ ∃C ∈ Aϕ : i ∈ C follows from Proposition 5(f) as λT = 0 for
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(f) (decomposition into net values) The following representation of ϕ as a sum of unique
Lagrange multipliers λT ,
ϕi =

T∈Θ:i∈T λT , λT ≥ 0,(29)
λT (v(T )−

t∈T ϕt) = 0, ∀T ∈ Θ,
follows from the KKT conditions for the inequality-constrained quadratic program (18). On
the other hand, by Proposition 3(ii),
(30) v(C) =

k∈C ϕk, ∀C ∈ Aϕ.















T∈Θ:T =C #(C ∩ T )
zvT
#T
, where, zvX = #X · λX . 
As advanced, there is a striking similarity of the property stated in Proposition 5(f)
with the decomposition of Shapley values into Harsanyi dividends (Harsanyi, 1959). The
latter can be defined recursively as follows:




v(C), #C > 1.
The dividend dv(C) is the value that the coalition C creates in excess of the values generated








Hence, if each coalition C brings forth a dividend dv(C) and each member of C owns an
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decomposed into equal shares of net values (27) of the coalitions to which i belongs. These
values internalize the opportunity cost of inputs (which can be used in at most one coalition
at each date). The value zv(C) captures the net surplus of the coalition C after taking into
account that the input of each i ∈ C, used in the production of v(C), could have been
used to produce surplus in other coalitions. For instance, the net values in Example 2 are
computed by (27) as,
zv({1, 2}) = zv({1, 3}) = 2/3 < v{{1, 2}} = v{{1, 3}} = 1.
In particular, zv({1, 2}) obtains by subtracting from v({1, 2}) player 1’s contribution to
zv({1, 3}), which does not materialize when player 1 cooperates in coalition {1, 2}.
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